A Cognitive Semantic Study of Reference in Meaning Construction in Shaw's 'Man and Superman' and 'Candida'

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Abstract – This paper seeks to cognitively determine the reference role in the meaning construction process through the application of mental spaces theory in Shaw's 'Man and Superman' and 'Candida'. The study also attempts to accurately clarify the matching between the linguistic expressions and the cognitive processes operated by reference in meaning construction. Further, this paper aims at investigating the reason(s) of prioritising some language forms in reference as well as statistically presenting the prevalence of those language devices in the plays' usage. The study has discovered that reference was one of the crucial triggers of the mental spaces theory advent and evolution as without reference, meaning construction faces failure in any communication. Meaning construction is entirely a mental process of the interlocutors, references is the language realisation and conception tool of those cognitive operations in mind. Therefore, reference is more like wireless connector between the interlocutors' mental and cognitive operations. Although there are certain language devices such as in/definite markers and pronouns used to make reference, it is essentially a complex mental process reflected in various and almost infinite forms of language.

Keywords: Cognitive, reference, meaning construction, mental spaces, dramatic discourse.

1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

1.1. Introduction

Nunberg (1978, pp. 11-17) is one of the pioneers in providing an account for reference where a linguistic item is used from one domain (the *trigger)* to refer to an entity in another domain (the *target).* The two domains, which may be set up locally, typically correspond to two categories of objects, which are mapped onto each other by a pragmatic function. For example, authors are matched with the books they write, or hospital patients are matched with the illnesses for which they are being treated. This kind of mapping plays an important role in structuring our knowledge base and provides means of identifying elements of one domain via their counterparts in the other. Coulson (2001, pp. 25-7) adds that there is a non-arbitrary relationship between the referrer entity and referent that allows speakers to map between domains. Further, this relationship is mediated by both general and situation-specific background knowledge. In mental space theory, the possibility of using a term from one space to refer to a linked element in another domain is known as the **Access Principle**. Following Fauconnier (1997, p. 41) *Access Principle* (also called *Identification* or the *ID principle*), which asserts that "if two elements a and b are linked by a connector F (b = F(a)), then element b can be identified by naming, describing, or pointing to its counterpart a". In reference, it is the access principle maintains that expressions that identify or detail a given

element in one mental space (so-called *triggers*) can be employed to access its match (so-called *targets*) in another mental space.

1.2. Statement of the Problem

In meaning construction phenomenon it is a widely held view that there is an abortive communication if human mind cannot conceive and connect the entities (referents) being referred to via language. Then, the question is how can reference enable human mind to assign the referent to the linguistic expression? And then how these referents communicated and connected at discourse level? The long-standing problem here is that the least or even no attention has accurately been paid to the mental processes that operate for meaning construction via reference.

Another prominent problem is that when meaning construction is dealt with in natural language as a conceptual and dynamic process rather than outcome of mind, it has been kept away from dramatic language. This is due to the claim that dramatic language is difficult and not easily analysable in terms of its linguistic structures.

1.3. Methodology

The study data collected from two of the most semantically rich works of Shaw, which are 'Man and Superman' and 'Candida'. Then, the two works are accurately read and manually worked on to locate and highlight the areas, parts, structures, devices and elements that match the needs of the study. For the analyses and examinations of these two plays, one of the most recent cognitive semantic theories is applied to the two plays, which is Fauconnier's (1985/ 1994) model of Mental Space theory. The study is a cognitive semantics qualitative work with paying little attention to quantitative aspect. The application is conducted by taking 25 examples from the two plays, and then sufficient discussions are provided in their analyses. The study mainly concentrates on the mental operations and cognitive process in the analyses of meaning construction through reference. Thus, the examples discussions illustrate how the interlocutors' mind works when meaning is being constructed before being realised verbally in reference.

2. LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS FOR THE MENTAL OPERATIONS

2.1. Connectors and Counterparts

If meaning construction is understood as the process of structuring and linking mental spaces, it suggests that meaning always emerges from understanding in a particular context. In the absence of an explicit context, speakers will create one for themselves based on their knowledge of typical situations and their default values.

Without an adequate understanding of the correspondences between elements in the different spaces, partitioning the information in the discourse has limited utility. To represent these sorts of relationships, speakers exploit abstract structure in each of the spaces to establish *links* (or *connectors)* between *counterparts,* or corresponding elements (Coulson, 2001, pp. 22-3). Further, (Evans & Green, 2006, p. 375) highlight that counterparts are established on the basis of **pragmatic function**: when two (or more) elements in different

mental spaces have a related pragmatic function, they are counterparts. One salient type of pragmatic function is **identity**, as in:

(1) *Octavius. Mr Ramsden:* **Jack** *is a man of honor… I think you are prejudiced against* **him.**

<div align="right">(Man and Superman, p. 59)</div>

Here, *Jack* is a selected name for the character and *him* is the pronoun referring back to Jack. The reference relates the two entities, which are two linguistic units, are **co-reference** or **identity** to the same person. That is to say, both linguistic units refer to the same individual together form a chain of reference. The linguistic unit '*Jack'* is an element in the base space, and the linguistic unit '*him'* is an element existing in another space, which is Octavius's belief space. Both of these elements exist in different mental spaces but **are co-referential** since they refer to the same person. Therefore, they are counterparts and connected by an identity known as **identity connector**. With reference to meaning construction, this utterance is at the beginning of the play. Octavius had not become sure that Ramsden seriously and truly expresses his dislikes towards Ann's feeling for Jack. Thus, Octavius constructs the meaning of his utterance in a way that in reality space Octavius notices Jack's suitable character, which is why he assigns the property '*man of honor'* to Jack in base space. When it comes to the second clause of the utterance, Octavius did not want to directly tell Ramsden that you are biased against Jack. That is why, Octavius assigns the property '*you are prejudiced against…'* in another space, which is his belief space.

In this example each clause sets up its own mental space, although it is not always the case that every sentence gives rise to its own mental space. We only need to set up a new mental space if the utterance contains a new space builder. As this example illustrates, not every mental space is introduced by an explicit space builder. For example, the base space introduced by the first sentence in (1) is established by our background knowledge that Jack is character in the book or drama being described. The expression *Jack* induces the schema that is associated with this knowledge. This shows that background knowledge can function as an implicit space builder. If this space builder were made explicit, the sentence might begin *In the play. . . .* When a mental space lacks an explicit space builder, it does not receive a label like PLAY or BOOK because this information is implicit.

In this example, the first mental space is set up by the introduction of the element corresponding to the name *Jack*. This entity is assigned the property introduced by the indefinite NP *a man of honor*, which describes *Jack* rather than introducing a separate entity because the two expressions are connected by **Trans-spatial operator** *is*. In the second clause, *I think* is a space builder which constructs a new BELIEF space. This mental space also features an element, introduced by *him*. Notice that *him* refers to the same person as *Jack*. In linguistics, the process whereby one expression relies on another for full interpretation is called **anaphora**. The dependent expression (*him)* is called an **anaphor** and the expression it relies upon for its meaning (*Jack*) is called the **antecedent**. The establishment of a link between an anaphor and an antecedent is a type of **inference**, an interpretation is 'worked out' on the basis of establishing **co-reference** between the two expressions. Anaphora relies on inference because an expression like *him*, unlike the name *Jack*, lacks the semantic properties

to uniquely define its **referent**: it could in principle refer to any male entity. This means that the hearer, here is Ramsden, or even the reader has to 'work out' which entity it refers to by searching the context for a likely candidate via the access principle.

One consequence of the Access Principle is that expressions referring to a particular counterpart can typically provide access to entities in mental spaces in either direction. In other words, connectors can 'link upwards' or 'link downwards' between spaces. When this occurs, the connector is said to be **open**. For example, the element corresponding to the anaphor *him* in example (1) serves as the **trigger** to access the element corresponding to the element a (*Jack*), the **target**, in the base. In this example, the connector 'links upwards' to a previously established space. Access can also 'link downwards' from one mental space to a subsequently established space. This access principle allows the characters of the play generally, and Ramsden and Octavius especially here to access elements in different mental spaces via using linguistic units only as prompts to make meaning and to conceptualise meaning.

Base

a1

BELIFE

| a1: Name: Jack |
| Property: a man of honor |

| a2: him |
| Property: being prejudiced against |

a2

Figure 1: Connecting the counterparts via identity connector

2.2. Definiteness

Noun phrases (NPs) beginning with *the* or *a/an* are prototypical *definite* and *indefinite* NPs in English. In mental space theory definiteness is discussed by Fauconnier (1994, p. 20) in this way: 'The noun phrase *the N* in a linguistic expression points to an element *a* already in some space M, such that "N"*(a)* holds in that space'.

What this characteristic says is that definite NPs identify elements in mental spaces which are already set up. The characteristic of indefinite descriptions, on the other hand, goes as follows: 'The noun phrase *a N* in a linguistic expression sets up a new element *w* in some space, such that "N"*(w)* holds in that space.'

This amounts to saying that the difference between *definite* and *indefinite* descriptions resides in the way elements set up in a mental space. According to Fauconnier, these characteristics are not complete as they only explain value readings.

Noun phrases that have a definite interpretation are those that occur with the definite article *the*, *proper names*, and possessive *pronouns* as in:

(2) A. *Ramsden ... but he often talked it over with me; and I have no more doubt than I have that you're sit- ting there that **the will** appoints me Annie's trustee and guardian.*

<div align="right">(Man and Superman, p. 9)</div>

B. *Proserpine. **Her** eyes are not a bit better than mine now* (Candida, p. 7)

C. *Candida…Ask **James's** mother and his three sisters what..* (Candida, p. 54)

In (2A) Ramsden intends to show his priority over Tanner to guard Ann. To strengthen his priority, Ramsden needs a kind of support and proof that is also conceptualised and admitted by Tanner. That is why, he uses Mr Whitefield's *will* with the definite article *the*, which means not only for himself but for Tanner it is a clear proof what is being referred to with uttering the linguistic items 'the will'. Ramsden connects the elements of the on-line mental space to some already pre-existing mental spaces in the discourse. And in the construction meaning of the sentence, by using the definite article, the speaker 'Ramsden' enables the listener 'Tanner' to access and to move from the on-line mental space to other pre-existing ones for the conceptualisation. If Ramsden did not use the definite article here, his proof would not be conceptualised by Tanner, and finally Ramsden's support and proof would be weak, further, Tanner would still argue for taking Ann's guardian priority.

In (2b), Proserpine is using the possessive pronoun *her* as she is talking to Lexy, this is because this pronoun functions to refer back to an already existing element earlier in the discourse and accessible to the listener and reader as well. Thus, Proserpine builds a mental space based on a pre-existing space, so when she says *her*, Lexy completely understands that *her* means Candida. This is a backward shift from the present mental space to an earlier one, and it is based on the earlier one that the present mental space makes meaning and that meaning is correctly conceptualised by the listener. Equally, for (2c), Candida is talking to Marchbanks and builds a new mental space, which has the element of *mother*. For making meaning in her utterance, Candida builds that new mental space by connecting it backwards to a pre-existing mental space that is already accessible in the discourse, which has the element *Morell* in it. Hence, the new mental space makes meaning for the speaker 'Candida' and conceptualised by the listener 'Marchbanks' when they shift the point of view from the new mental space back to the earlier mental space in the discourse. It is done so, by using the *possessive 's*. Otherwise, only the word *mother* would be vague in meaning, and neither Candida makes meaning of it successfully nor does Marchbanks conceptualise it.

In this paper, it has been found that definiteness can also be expressed via other linguistic items such as *subject pronouns, object pronouns,* and *demonstratives,* as in:

(3) A. *Octavius. Yes: we must face it, Mr Ramsden. But I owed **him** a great deal. **He** did everything for me that my father could have done if **he** had lived.*   (Man and Superman, p. 5)

B. *Ramsden. You are at present a guest beneath the roof of one of the old cats, sir. My sister is the mistress of **this** house.* (Man and Superman, p. 39)

C. *Tanner. I won't have it, Ann. I am no more **that** schoolboy now than I am the dotard of ninety I shall grow into if I live long enough. It is over: let me forget it.*

(Man and Superman, p. 42)

D. *Tanner.* **That** *will be a Declaration of Independence with a vengeance. You can write a book about it afterwards. That will finish your mother and make a woman of you.*

(Man and Superman, p. 82)

E. *Octavius. We feel **that**, as you may imagine, pretty deeply.* (Man and Superman, p. 88)

F. *Morell Why do you want her to know **this**?* (Candida, p. 21)

In example (3a), Octavius is talking to Ramsden about Mr Whitefield's manliness to Octavius. So, in the construction meaning of his sentence, instead of repeatedly saying the name, Octavius serially uses subject pronoun *he* and object pronoun *him* to refer back to Mr Whitefield. This is because Octavius is sure that by using *he* and *him* anaphora Ramsden is instantly enabled for the referent conceptualisation. Further, Octavius uses *he* and *him* as elements in on-line mental spaces of the discourse, but they have counterpart in some already constructed mental spaces in the discourse. Thus, the anaphora function as triggers to access and identify the target via mapping backwards for the interlocutors. Similarly, in (3b) Ramsden is talking to Tanner about Miss Ramsden. Ramsden uses the demonstrative *this* to specify which house he refers to. Here, the demonstrative *this* links the present information, which means the element in the on-line mental space, to an old information, which was presented in some already pre-existing mental spaces in the discourse. If Ramsden said *house* without the demonstrative, it would be unspecified to Tanner, since *house* could mean any houses or her own family house. But Ramsden did not do that, because he and Tanner had been arguing over Mr Whitefield's house, so the demonstrative *this* is a prompt to specify which house is being referred to. Therefore, the demonstrative enables the interlocutors to construct and conceptualise meaning about the entity being referred to 'Ramsden's house' via backwardly linking the on-line mental space information to some information in already constructed mental space in the discourse. In the same way, the demonstrative *that* in (3c) does not present any pieces of new information, but links present information to prior ones in the discourse. In such a sentence, Tanner constructs the meaning of his sentence by linking it backwardly to some other information that is known to the listener 'Ann'. Here, Tanner uses the demonstrative *that* to connect the on-line mental space element, which is his novelty, difference and appropriateness in thinking and behaviour, to a pre-existing mental space element, which was cultural-based, foolish and inappropriate thought and behaviour. He successfully shows her his positive changes and enables her to conceptualise the meaning of what he is saying by going back to school time, and that demonstrative *that* functions as the access point for the interlocutors 'Tanner and Ann' to move backwards and forwards between past Tanner and present Tanner for the meaning making.

Not only can the demonstrative *this* and *that* be used as definite makers, but in examples (3d, e and f) it is seen that the linguistic items *that* and *this* are used as pronouns and play the same role in definiteness. In examples (3d, e and f), *that* and *this* are used as a subject and object pronouns by Tanner, Octavius and Morell respectively. In the meaning construction of

their sentences, the speakers do not present and any new additional pieces of information, but via *that* and *this* they connect the present information, which are elements in the on-line mental spaces, to some older pieces of information in the discourse, which had been elements in the pre-existing mental space. For meaning making, the listeners, namely Ann, Ramsden and Marchbanks have to backwardly connect *that* and *this* to some earlier presented knowledge to find out what *that* exactly refers to. This is because these linguistic items are triggers to access the target in some other mental spaces. This is to say, they are references to denote to their referents. The definite elements of the mental spaces used in the two plays are numerically shown in table 1.

Table 1 The number of the definite elements makers in mental space in both plays

No	Definite elements makers In mental spaces		Frequency in Man and Superman	Frequency in Candida	Total Frequency
1.	Definite article		1197	786	1983
2.	Pronouns				
	A. Possessive pronouns	My	390	78	468
		Your	327	129	456
		His	436	256	692
		Her	148	73	221
		Its	62	3	65
		Our	93	13	106
		Their	108	7	115
	B. Subject pronouns	He	528	292	820
		She	463	178	641
		It	418	128	546
		I	1342	592	1934
		You	1021	443	1464
		We	234	45	279
		They	189	76	260
	C. Object pronouns	Him	282	170	452
		Her	185	98	283
		It	353	155	508
		Me	485	175	660
		You	266	109	375
		Us	91	32	123
		Them	145	43	188
3.	Demonstratives	This	165	45	210
		that	100	64	164
4.	Pronoun	This	34	9	43
		that	157	77	234
5.	Possessive 's	'S	4	4	8
		S'	9	1	10
	Total		8211	4017	12228

2.3. Indefiniteness

Indefinite noun phrases mainly occur in the indefinite article *a/an* and *bare plurals*, as in:

(4) A. *Morell... **An honest man** feels that he must pay Heaven for every hour of happiness with a good spell of hard, unselfish work to make others happy...* (Candida, p. 6)

B. Tanner…*She can't bully **men** as she bullies **women**; so she habitually and un-scrupulously uses her personal fascination to make **men** give her whatever she wants.*

(Man and Superman, p. 222)

In example (4a), Morell gives advices to his church friend Lexy not to miss his prayers, get married, be thankful and enjoy his life. Morell constructs the meaning of his utterance that he does not want to criticise or rebuke Lexy. Similarly, he does not want to directly exemplify himself as being an ideal man. Thus, he brings a new element into the ongoing talk between them by the indefinite article *an*. That is a new element in an on-line mental space just being built in the discourse. Elements that are unfamiliar or have not already been mentioned in the conversation cannot be connected back to any pre-existing mental spaces. Information about this new element is not accessible in the earlier mental spaces in the discourse. The inaccessibility of the new element in the pre-existing mental spaces leads the listener 'Lexy' for a specific reading in which Morell meant himself as an ideal man in religion, social life and enjoyment. It could also mean anyone else who can fulfil religious, social and life responsibilities in the non-specific reading. Equally in (4b), Tanner is talking to Mrs Whitefield about Ann's domination to women and men. In the meaning construction of the sentence Tanner uses subsequent bare plurals: *men, women* and *men* to generalise what he says without being specific in his reference. That means the new element in his on-line mental space is non-specific and thus open to include and refer to any men and women who can be bullied by Ann's words. Additionally, in the non-specific reading Tanner indirectly tells Mrs Whitefield that Ann may have oppressed women like you, but she cannot do that for men such as me. These NPs have indefinite interpretation because they typically introduce new elements into the discourse. Here both NPs *men* and *women* are new elements that had not been mentioned, so such NPs cannot be prompts to access their counterparts in other pre-existing mental spaces.

Further to Fauconnier (1984, 1997) and Evans and Green (2006), in Langacker's (1987) Cognitive Grammar and specifically in Radden and René's (2007, p. 115) Cognitive Grammar, linguistic items like *few*, *several*, *some* and *many* are treated as scalar quantifiers, while linguistic items like *no, any* and *most* as set quantifiers. Haspelmath (1997, pp. 106-110) and Abbott's (2004, pp.122-149) view does not sit in parallel to Langacker's and Radden and René's as Haspelmath and Abbott group these linguistic items with the *indefinites*. Here the latter view is concerned in this work, because these linguistic items, despite specifying the quantity, do not refer to the entities exactly, as in:

(5) A. *Tanner. Yes, a lifetime of happiness. If it were only the first half hour's happiness, Tavy, I would buy it for you with my last penny. But a lifetime of happiness! **No man** alive could bear it: it would be hell on earth* (Man and Superman, p. 16)

B. *Mendoza. Just allow me to read **a few lines** before you go to sleep. I should really like your opinion of them.* (Man and Superman, p. 115)

C. *The Old Woman. A murderer! Oh, how dare they send me to herd with murderers! I was not as bad as that: I was a good woman. There is **some mistake**: where can I have it set right?*

(Man and Superman, p. 120)

D. *Marchbanks. I finished the poem about the angel quarter of an hour ago. I've read you **several things** since.* (Candida, p. 41)

E. *ANA. It is all nonsense: **most marriages** are perfectly comfortable.*

(Man and Superman, p. 163)

F. *Don Juan. **Many companionships**, **they** tell me, are touchingly affection- ate; and most are at least tolerably friendly. But that does not make a chain a desirable ornament nor the galleys an abode of bliss.* (Man and Superman, p. 163)

G. *Ann.. I do not think **any** young unmarried woman should be left quite to her own guidance.*

(Man and Superman, p. 24)

Regarding (5a), Tanner is talking to Octavius and refuses any happiness in marriage. So, in the continuation of his sentence meaning construction, Tanner sustains his words by exemplifying indirectly via introducing a new element 'man' in a new on-line mental space without exactly specifying it by the indefinite marker 'no'. While Tanner completely refuses such happiness, Octavius denies the existence of happiness in marriage. Thus, Tanner extends his denial to encompass all men, including Octavius and he does that indirectly and leaves no chance for happiness. Tanner's denial extends the element in the on-line mental space to include Octavius but without being specified. He successfully did that via introducing a new element 'man' in an on-line mental space, but that space cannot be connected backwardly to any other pre-existing mental spaces in the discourse. Tanner did not want to have clashes with Octavius and that is why Tanner expressed his refusal in an indefinite way. The indefinite expressing can lead to two interpretations for Octavius' meaning making. The specific reading in which Tanner means Octavius cannot achieve that happiness, and the non-specific reading in which he means no one can get that happiness. In (5b) Mendoza is talking to Tanner about Shakespeare's work. Mendoza asks for permission to read the book in his hand, and he uses the indefinite marker *a few* with the NP *lines*. The reason he constructs his sentence meaning in this way is that in the specific reading he means the *lines* that both Mendoza and Tanner know which lines are being referred to, so the lines can be their desired lines. In this case, the element 'lines' in the on-line mental space connected backwardly to

some other information in pre-existing mental spaces in the discourse. While in the non-specific reading, it means any group of lines that Mendoza himself wishes to read or any group of lines that come to in front of his eyes. In that case, the element 'lines' in the on-line mental space is treated as new piece of information being added to the discourse.

In (5c) the Old Woman is talking to Don Juan about her misdeeds. In doing that she uses the indefinite maker *some* with the uncountable NP *mistake*, this is because she introduces a new element in an on-line mental space, which is *mistake*. The indefinite maker *some* quantifies the amount of the *mistake* but does not specify what the mistake really refers to or what the mistakes really are. Thus, in meaning making there are two readings, namely: the specific reading in which she means all has been said about her by Don Juan is mistake. Here, Don Juan's words are the elements in her on-line mental space. And in the non-specific reading she means anything that Don Juan has heard about her is mistake. In this non-specific reading the element in her on-line mental space is open to cover Don Juan's words plus what he has heard about her. In (5a, b, and c) the specific reading is usually true for the speaker, whereas the specific or non-specific reading can be true for the listener, since the linguistic item being expressed with an indefinite maker to introduce the novelty of the element into the discourse. In (5d) Marchbanks is talking to Candida about reading poem. When Candida asks him to read the poems, he says I finished the poems and I have also read *several things* more after the poems. This means Marchbanks constructs the meaning of his sentence with an indefinite maker *several* to quantify an amount but he does not specify what *the several things* exactly refer to. This is because the NP *things* is a new element in an on-line mental space and the meaning of it cannot be accessed by the listener based on other pre-existing mental spaces of the discourse even if it was expressed with a definite maker. So, for introducing that new element in the on-line mental space the speaker uses an indefinite maker *several*. The introduction of this new element 'several things' into the discourse becomes more certain when Candida admits that she was not aware of even the end part of the poem due to her business with the poker.

Moreover, in (5e) Ann is talking to Don Juan about marriage. Ann shows the success in the majority of marriages with the quantifier *most* to strengthen her attitude as well as to weaken Don Juan's counter-attitude. Up to that moment, they had been talking about the downsides of marriage, failure marriages and inconvenient marriages, Ann introduces *comfortable marriages* via indefinite maker *most* as a new piece of information into the discourse. This implies that comfortable marriage is completely a new addition to what had been talked about downsides of marriage, failure marriages and inconvenient marriages, in the discourse. The information of *most marriages* is a new element in an on-line mental space in the discourse that cannot be accessed via some other pre-existing mental spaces that have pieces of information like downsides of marriage, failure marriages and inconvenient marriages as their elements. When Ann describes the nature of men, marriage, especially her desirable marriage, to Ann's answer in (5f) Don Juan opposes marriage by using the indefinite maker *many*, which refers to the considerable amount, but it does not refer to the entities to say who 'championships' are. Don Juan constructs the meaning of his sentence with the linguistic item *many* to change Ann's idea that the quantity of what you talk about is a lot. Further, Don Juan knows that the NP championships is a new information in the

discourse, so he expresses that information as a new element in an on-line mental space. Thus, in the meaning construction, for Don Juan is usually clear who the *championships* specifically are, and knows that Ann does not, so he brings it into the discourse as a new and non-specified information. For Ann's meaning conceptualisation, *championships* can refer to the man that Ann has in mind, and it can also refer to any men that has the characteristics of heroes. In this way, neither of the referents can be suitable for Ann's marriage and that is the meaning that Don Juan conveyed. Interestingly, for repeating *championships* he uses *they*, a definite NP, which means it has become clear for Ann by that moment.

Lastly, in (5g) the linguistic item, namely free choice *any*, is used by Ann in talking to Tanner. She constructs the meaning of her sentence by using an indefinite maker, because at the very beginning she did not want to directly ask Tanner to be her guardian. Therefore, *any* makes the NP indefinite and does not refer to entity that had been mentioned earlier. Simply, *any* makes the NP to be a new piece of information added in the conversation. *Any* is an element in the on-line mental space that cannot be connected to any other pieces of information presented in the pre-existing mental spaces earlier in the discourse. In the specific reading, Ann refers to herself as young woman to be guarded, but the non-specific reading is for Tanner in which *any* could refer to Ann or all women who has Ann's circumstance need to be guarded. The indefinites elements of the mental spaces used in the two plays are numerically shown in table 2.

Table 2: *The number of the indefinite elements makers in mental space in both plays*

No	Indefinite elements maker in mental spaces	Frequency in Man and Superman	Frequency in Candida	Total Frequency
1.	Indefinite articles Singular a/an	896	342	1238
2.	Other linguistic items No	81	27	108
	A few/Few	10	7	17
	Several	1	2	3
	Some	39	16	55
	Many	12	8	20
	Most	12	5	17
3.	Polarity sensitive and Free choice 'any'	71	21	92
	Total	1122	447	1569

2.4. Nouns and Pronouns Across Spaces

A number of researchers have noted that full noun phrases and pronouns simply do not convey the same nuances, even when they refer to the same person or thing, simply referent. Among those researchers Fauconnier's mental space in (1985) points to Names and descriptions as grammatically noun phrases. Names *(Max, Napoleon, Nabisco)* and descriptions *(the mailman, a vicious snake, some boys who were tired)* either set up new elements or point to existing elements in the discourse construction. They also associate such

elements with properties *(e.g.,* "having the name Napoleon," "being a boy," "being tired") (Fauconnier, 1997 p. 40). Regarding the pronouns, Fauconnier (1994 p. 35) states that because the connectors that link elements in different spaces are *open,* a pronoun with an antecedent in one space can freely identify its counterpart in another, connected space. This would come as no surprise if one viewed all the counterparts as being in some sense "the same" element. However, there are some interesting facts that seem to rule out this possibility even in its weakest form in some cases. Shortly after the rise of mental space theory, Accessibility Theory of Givoˊn (1989) and Ariel (1990) posits that different nominal forms signal different degrees of ''accessibility'' of a referent, where accessibility means something like 'the ease with which the conception can be brought into conscious awareness'.

When the *name* is a full noun phrase indicates that the person or thing it refers to requires relatively more effort to access, either because the addressee is not currently thinking about the person or because the person is entirely unfamiliar. A *pronoun* access is relatively easily retrieved, such as the conception of a person already under discussion or physically present (Givoˊn 1989, p. 90). In linking both, Accessibility Theory sustains Mental Space Theory by providing a way of grounding the co-reference facts in the mental experience of the speaker and addressee. The issue is thus not a matter of abstract geometric relationships between nodes and nominals, but of the mental models the speakers construct and the cues they give to indicate the status of a referent relative to the current context, take these examples:

(6) Don Juan. ***my friend the romantic man*** *was often too poor or too timid to approach those women who were beautiful or refined enough to seem to realize* ***his*** *ideal; and so* ***he*** *went to* ***his*** *grave believing in* ***his*** *dream.* (Man and Superman, p. 156)

In (6), Don Juan is talking to Ann about the relationship with women. He exemplifies his conversation with a friend by putting him in a noun phrase (*my friend the romantic man)*. In the meaning construction of such a sentence, for the speaker it takes more mental effort to indicate the person being referred to via using pre-modifiers with the NP, as the element and its properties in the space. And, for the meaning conceptualisation of the listener 'Ann', such NP requires relatively more mental effort to access the referent person via moving backwards to other pieces of information presented as elements in the already pre-existing mental spaces in the discourse. What is more, there is a kind of room for the listener 'Ann' to misinterpret the NP, especially when the speaker does not use the correct prompts and hints as triggers to enable the listener to access the target 'referent'. Therefore, 'Ann' may not know who exactly the intended 'the romantic man' is. For more specificity, in the subsequent clause the speaker 'Don Juan' uses the personal pronoun 'he' this reduces both interlocutors' mental effort to access the referent as well as minimizes the chance of misinterpretation of the referent form the listener's side. Hence, proper names and anaphors are more competent triggers to identify existing elements in the on-line mental space and possibly their counterparts in other pre-existing mental spaces, than NPs descriptions. For (6), the sentence would be much more influential on the listener 'Ann' if the speaker 'Don Juan' mentioned the name instead of the NP description. Don Juan uses such an NP because he does not have the exact person, as a specified element in his on-line mental space, to be the referent straightforwardly. Therefore, Don Juan just would like to make his sentence more persuasive with an example. Otherwise,

he could use the name of the friend, or even if the friend was familiar to Ann, he would use an antecedent pronoun to enable Ann to conceptualise it.

In support of example (6) analysis, the notion of accessibility to nouns and pronouns in discourse can also be best thought of in terms of the corollary notion of conceptual distance. Something which is more accessible is conceptually closer to the speaker, and addressee, such as pronouns, than something which is less accessible for them, such as NP descriptions Langacker's (1985, pp.111-118). According to the view, the NP of example (6) is even less convincing and effective for the speaker 'Don Juan' himself, then how such an NP could not be less persuasive for the listener's account than a name or a pronoun.

The use of different references such as an NP and a pronoun to identify the same referent becomes especially clear in the case of first-person reference. Under most circumstances, it is anomalous for the speaker to refer to himself or herself by name, as in:

(7) **ANN**. *Don't be foolish, Jack. Mr Ramsden has always been Grandpapa Roebuck to me: I am Granny's **Annie**; and he is **Annie's** Granny.*   (Man and Superman, p. 24)

In this example, Ann is talking to Tanner about being her guardian. Ann is the speaker and refers to herself by a name 'Ann' is usually strange. This is because she constructs the meaning of her sentence in a way that she can see herself outside, as she would see another person. Only a shift in point of view can make sense of such usage. For this reason, reference to the speaker via a name may be used as a signal of a point of view shift. In this example Ann's use of her own name implies that she is talking an external perspective and thus highlights the fact that she is describing 'Annie' within the other's conception, especially Tanner and Ramsden's conception of reality not her own self-conception. She is doing that to mediate the situation as Tanner might be unhappy with such names, Annie and Granny, to be used for communication to call Ann and her guard. Additionally, by constructing the meaning of her sentence like that, Ann wants to strengthen the relationship between herself and Tanner, so the conceptual distance reduction between her and Tanner can reflect in their physical distance relation.

There are similar restrictions on the use of a name to refer to the addressee. Generally, the use of *names* instead of pronoun *you* to address the addressee occur at the very beginning of the sentence, as in example (8a), or at the very end, as in (8b):

(8) A. *Ramsden. [breezily, as he pats her affectionately on the back] My dear **Annie**, nonsense. I insist on Granny. I won't answer to any other name than Annie's Granny.*
*ANN. [gratefully] **You** all spoil me, except Jack.*   (Man and Superman, p. 28)

B. *Candida (quaintly). He cleans the boots, **Eugene**. **You** will have to clean them tomorrow for saying that about him.*   (Candida, p. 30)

Using a *name* rather than pronoun *you* to address the listener is permissible only when the speaker 'Ramsden' wants to get the addressee's 'Ann' attention, since the addressee is not yet paying or mentally less paying attention to the element in the on-line space that the speaker is building or focussing on. So, to attract the listener, Ramsden tells the listener 'Ann' that it is

her who is the element of the space that he is focussing on within the lattice in the discourse. In the response of that, this time Ann, as the speaker, uses the pronoun *you* to address the addressee 'Ramsden' to lessen her focus or even defocus on the space that has Ramsden as its element. Otherwise, she could have used Ramsden's name to show the same mental focus about him. Meanwhile, in example (8b) the speaker 'Candida' is talking to her addresses 'Eugene' and uses his name at the end of her sentence. She constructs the meaning of her sentence in such way to reassure the addressee 'Eugene', as the listener, has the speaker's full attention or sympathy. This means that Candida confirms to him that she has him 'Eugene' as the element in the space she is focussing on in the lattice in the discourse, not Morell. Candida's attention and concentration for Eugene and her defocus for Morell is verified by the whole play as the discourse context. Here there is a comprehensive mapping between Candida's thought and her verbal language of communication.

Third-person pronouns such as *he, she, they*, *him*, *her*, *them* and so forth do not refer to participants in the discourse. In this case, third person pronouns refer to people or things which are physically present or has already been discussed. Connections have been established via these pronouns between the on-line mental spaces elements 'references', as newly added pieces of information, and the pre-existing mental spaces elements 'referents', other old pieces of information, as part of the shared discourse world of the speaker and addressee. Therefore, even a third-person pronoun portrays its referent as conceptually close to the discourse participants by being shared knowledge understood by both.

In the case of third-person reference, use of a *name* is not as highly restricted as it is in the case of first- and second-person reference. Since the person or thing being talked about has some sorts of counterparts in the earlier pre-existing mental spaces and this counterpart requires the third-person pronoun as a trigger to access those already built mental spaces and identify the exact referent.

There is more flexibility with regards to construing *him, her,* or *it* as part of the shared knowledge in the spaces. Nevertheless, the difference in implied conceptual distance between pronouns and full noun phrases is robust enough that speakers frequently choose forms of reference to convey their attitude toward the person being spoken of. Speakers frequently use full names when they wish to express ridicule or disapproval of a person, even in contexts in which a pronoun could have been used with no loss of clarity (van Hoek, 1997a pp. 39–42). Furthermore, Fox (1987b, pp. 12-19) adds that full names or noun phrases are also used when the speaker disagrees with something that another speaker has just said about the referent. The conceptual distancing implied by the name signals that the speaker is holding the other person's idea ''at arm's length'' rather than accepting it and building on it, as in:

(9) *Morell (turning away from her, heart-stricken). So **Eugene** says.*

*Candida (with lively interest, leaning over to him with her arms on his knee). **Eugene** is always right. He's a wonderful boy...*   (Candida, p. 34)

In the meaning construction of this example, Candida could use the third-person pronoun 'he' instead of the name 'Eugene' without violating any grammatical rules of sentence or the loss of clarity in referring to intended referent. But she used the name 'Eugene' as the first linguistic item in the sentence to express her disagreement about what Morell just said

concerning the referent 'Eugene'. That is to say, she shows her dislikes of Morell's words about Eugene and even she is not ready to accept his words. Thus, she disagrees with the properties that have been assigned to the element 'Eugene' in Morell's new mental space. That is why, she builds a separate on-line mental space for the element 'Eugene' and she wants her space to be connected to other earlier mental spaces in the discourse, rather than Morell's. Based on the discourse context, Candida and Morell have different views and even quarrel about Eugene, throughout the play whenever she praises Eugene Morell is undermining him, whenever Morell dispraises Eugene, she takes Eugene's side with a praise.

Another interesting space connecter in reference is the pronoun *it*. Sometimes, the referent of the pronoun *it* cannot be identified with that of an antecedent nominal, neither within the discourse context, not with a uniquely salient entity in the extralinguistic context. These are the uses which are said to be *impersonal*, as the pronoun does not refer to any specific individual or sets of individuals. Within non-cognitive semantics, Bolinger's (1977, pp. 84–5) characterization is, to some extent, suitable about this pronoun, where 'a 'definite' nominal with almost the greatest possible generality of meaning, limited only in the sense that it is 'neuter' it embraces *weather*, *time*, *circumstance*, whatever is obvious by the nature of reality or the implications of context'. Within cognitive semantics, following Radden et al. (2007a, p. 179), while the term *impersonal* seems quite appropriate for *it*, it raises a serious question: How can a *personal* pronoun '*it*' function as an *impersonal* pronoun? Or more fundamentally, what sorts of meanings does this impersonal pronoun have?, it is often claimed that impersonal pronouns have no meaning at all, being inserted for purely grammatical purposes. They do, of course, serve grammatical functions. This does not, however, entail their meaninglessness, quite the contrary, even from Langacker's Cognitive Grammar perspective, grammar itself is meaningful. So, how come such a personal pronoun is meaningless? Indeed, it is argued that the impersonal pronouns of English, especially *it*, display essentially the same meanings they have in personal uses, as in:

(10). *Proserpine. Look here: if you don't stop talking like this, I'll leave the room, Mr. Marchbanks: I really will.* **It's** *not proper.*   (Candida, p. 24)

In this example, *Proserpine*, who is Morell's secretary, is talking to Marchbanks, who is Morell's contestant for Candida's love. Marchbanks is prevented to talk like that by the girl 'Proserpine'. She might very well complain by saying (**It's** *not proper)* at the end of her utterance. What precisely, does the pronoun *it* refer to in this context? Does the *it* refer to Marchbanks' thought, does the *it* refer to the fact that his way of thinking is improper? Does the *it* refer to Marchbanks full utterance? Does the *it* refer to the idea that he speaks about Morell improperly? Does the *it* refer to the subject of the conversation as inappropriateness of loving a married woman? Does the *it* mean the place of the conversation 'the room'? or the action of listening to him? Thus, how the listener 'Marchbanks' is supposed to identify the referent by such a trigger 'it'. That is to say, how can he successfully connect the on-line mental space that has *it* as the element, to other pre-existing mental spaces to identify the referent in them.

Actually, the pronoun *it* could refer to one or few or some of these, or all of the above. The point, though, is that even the speaker 'Proserpine' may not know the referent exactly. *It*

refers to some aspects of the situation overall, but just what it designates may simply be indeterminate. Such vagueness is very common and clearly useful. Based on the play, as the discourse context, Proserpine is not interested in talking to Marchbanks, so in such utterance she uses (*it's…*) to avoid specifying what *it* exactly stands for. In the meaning making by the listener 'Marchbanks' he can make multiple connections between the on-line mental space that has *it* and to a pre-existing mental space that has his thought in it, or to a pre-existing mental space that has his utterance in it, or to a pre-existing mental space that has the subject of the conversation in it, or to a pre-existing mental space that has the place of the conversation in it, or to a pre-existing mental space that has her action of listening to him in it, or to some or all of them. Since these spaces are all available as pre-existing mental spaces in the lattice of the discourse. Any of these mental space connections by the listener means the speaker hits her target. This is because the speaker 'Proserpine' may not know what exactly refer to due to her instant psychological react towards him. Or she may not want to exactly specify what she refers to being improper, as the their discussion would continue over that. Or she may want to refer to all of the aspects of the discourse situation as all being improper to her. Therefore, it has been realised now such a pronoun has more meaning than other personal pronouns, but less determinate than them in some certain uses and this vague indeterminacy in those cases still fulfills semantic functions as seen in the above example.

In its various impersonal uses, *it* has its normal value as a third person singular neuter personal pronoun. *It* is impersonal simply by being construed with maximal vagueness. It can be reasonably thought of it as designating the relevant *scope of awareness* for whatever is at issue. With meteorological predicates (e.g. *It's raining* or *It's hot*), it tends to be interpreted as the surrounding atmospheric environment. With predicates of propositional attitude (e.g. *It's obvious the president is conscientious*), the relevant scope is construed more abstractly, subsuming everything brought to bear as the basis for judgment (observed actions, background knowledge, inference, and so on). But regardless of the nature of the predicate, the referent of *it* cannot be specified with any precision, precisely because it represents the extreme case of vagueness. Rather than being a discrete element within the scope of awareness, it encompasses the entire scope apprehended as an undifferentiated whole (Radden et al. 2007a, p. 180).

3. CONCLUSION AND FINDINGS

Mental Spaces theory, alongside its novelty, is one the most suitable theories of cognitive semantics to investigate reference role in meaning construction and conception in literary works such as drama, novel, poetry and even journalistic texts as well as everyday language due to series of reasons and outcomes which the study has arrived at as summarised below:

1. There is nothing in Fauconnier's theory that says the reference must only be of a particular form. The meaning construction via reference is a relatively autonomous cognitive process which makes use of linguistic information of various sorts, but there are few constraints on the expression type of this information, and even non-linguistic reference may be sufficient to set up a meaning.

2. It is statistically realised that Shaw heavily used language devices as references for meaning construction in the characters' utterances, as presented in table 2.1, there are

35 forward or backward referencing elements per page via the definite makers in 'Man and Superman'. Further, in 'Candida' the number is doubled to 70 referencing elements per page via the definite makers.

3. Result point (2) indicates that in 'Man and Superman' there is at least a reference in each and every line of the play. In 'Candida', there are couple of references in each line of the play. Besides, there are almost countless ways of making reference in language that seems to be impossible to pinpoint all. It is clear that mental spaces are set up not just by explicit space builders as references, but by other more indirect grammatical means, and also by non-linguistic pragmatic, cultural, and contextual factors. It follows that there is no complete algorithm yielding a reference configuration on the basis of available discourse only. This is not a weakness in the theory, it is one of its substantive claims of the theory that meaning making is a purely dynamic mental cognitive process. And, human mind is able to make indefinite number of novel meaningful sentence and that is the creative aspect of mind.

4. Since meaning-making is a purely mental cognitive process, meaning is not present in the linguistic items themselves, they are just prompts to trigger the meaning. This claim in the theory leads to argue that in any pieces of communication in general, and in the characters' communication in the plays in particular, the interlocutors' interaction are firstly mentally connected and the meaning of each linguistic expression is generated there, then these meanings are being realized verbally and physically via reference.

5. From a linguistic perspective, definite noun phrase is something known to the speaker and the listener, and indefinite is something is not known to the listener. From a cognitive semantic perspective, using definite and indefinite expression establishes a link between an old piece of information and a new piece of information. Thus, the characters use definiteness or indefiniteness as referencing tools for constructing the meaning of the utterances being old or new, and the listener also conceptualises the meaning via definiteness as s/he links it to an old one in a pre-existing space, or indefiniteness s/he makes new on-line space for it.

6. An interesting fact is that the statistical results indicate that Shaw used more *definite NPs* than *indefinite NPs* to establish more links between the characters' utterances, than presenting new pieces of information. For example, the play *Man and Superman* is divided into two equal halves, and in the first half Shaw used more indefinite articles of *a/an*, which is 587, while in the second half the number reduced to 309. For the definite article *the*, it was apposite. In the first half, there were 436 uses, whereas in the second half the number raised to 761. This is exactly matching mental space theory, as in the first half Shaw used more indefiniteness to introduce new pieces of information via reference for building new on-line mental spaces among the characters' utterances and to the readers. Meanwhile, in the half, he used more definiteness as the reference connects the new mental space to already pre-existing ones. This is how the characters are enabled to construct meaning and conceptualise meaning from their utterances.

7. In referencing, *NPs names* and *pronouns* can show connections between the on-line mental spaces with some pre-existing mental spaces within the lattice of discourse. In so doing, they show different degrees of the *referent identification* from the most mental efforts to the least mental efforts for meaning construction in this way:

Full name ➜*Long definite description* ➜ *Short definite description* ➜ *Last name* ➜ *first name* ➜ *Distal demonstrative* ➜ *proximate demonstrative* ➜*stressed pronouns* ➜ *unstressed pronoun* ➜ *clitic pronoun.*

8. It is also realised that using a name where is third person pronoun is required without the loss of clarity in referring to the intended referent is to express disagreement about what the other interlocutor said regarding the referent, as in example (9). Moreover, the listener would like to continue with on-line spaces has just been built by the speaker and has the referent as its element, but builds and separate on the space for the referent.

9. It was long claimed that impersonal pronouns such as 'it' in referencing can have no meanings at all, being inserted for purely grammatical purposes. They do, of course, serve grammatical functions. This does not, however, entail their meaninglessness, quite the contrary, even from Langacker's Cognitive Grammar perspective, grammar itself is meaningful. In example (10) indicated how referencing via such a pronoun has more meaning than other personal pronouns, but less determinate than them in some certain uses and this vague indeterminacy in those cases still fulfils semantic functions. Otherwise, how one and the characters successfully connect the on-line mental space that has *it* as the element, to other pre-existing mental spaces to identify the referent in them.

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